Pension Choices and Job Mobility in the UK by Andrietti, Vincenzo
Pension Choices and Job Mobility in the UK.
Vincenzo Andrietti∗
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Departamento de Economia
January 17, 2003
Abstract
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey we analyze the impact of second tier
pension scheme choices on job mobility within a discrete time hazard rate framework. We ﬁnd that
workers either oﬀered and participating or oﬀered and not participating to an occupational pension
plan have signiﬁcantly lower quit rates. However, once the endogeneity of pension scheme status is
accounted for through an instrumental variable procedure, these coeﬃcients are no more signiﬁcant.
Alternatively, the eﬀect of pension portability losses on quits’ hazards is never signiﬁcant. The
additional ﬁnding that workers participating to occupational pension plans are signiﬁcantly less
likely to quit for a non pension job can be interpreted as indirect evidence that they are in ”good”
jobs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Notwithstanding the pension reforms implemented in the last three decades, portability
of occupational pension rights is still a matter of public policy concern in the United
Kingdom. While provisions such as the reduction of the vesting period, inﬂation in-
dexation of deferred rights and the introduction of transfer options, have improved the
position of early leavers from occupational pension plans, there is still concern that
a lack of pension portability could be detrimental to labour market eﬃciency. Little
empirical work has been produced to support the policy debate. The few available
empirical studies are based on cross sectional data with retrospective questions or on
short panel data and/or do not take into account workers’ selection into pension ar-
rangements. The ”selection” issue is particularly relevant in the UK context, where
workers have the right to choose among diﬀerent pension arrangements provided to
supplement the basic State pension. This institutional framework is the outcome of a
number of reforms aiming to stimulate labour market ﬂexibility through more extensive
pension choices.
We estimate discrete time hazard rate models of job to job mobility where tran-
sitions are deﬁned according to exit reasons (voluntary/involuntary) and destination
states (quit to pension/non pension jobs). Our objective is to analyze the impact of
1occupational and personal pension arrangements on voluntary job mobility. If pension
participation status reﬂects workers’ choices, neglecting this endogeneity will introduce
bias in the estimates. We deal with this problem using an instrumental variables (IV)
approach. In particular, to identify the eﬀect of pension choices on job mobility haz-
ards we exploit the exogenous variation provided by a derived instrumental variable
representing the occupational pension oﬀer rate by industry, union coverage and ﬁrm
size. The occupational pension oﬀer rate is expected to bear a positive and signiﬁcant
correlation with occupational pension coverage and participation while being unrelated
to job turnover. Such a variable is included in the pension choice probit equations while
being excluded from the job to job transition hazards.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of occupational pension schemes on job mobility hazards
change signiﬁcantly while moving from the "simple" hazard model to the IV hazard
model. In the former, workers either oﬀered and participating or oﬀered but not par-
ticipating to an occupational pension plan have signiﬁcantly lower quit rates. However,
once endogeneity is accounted for the occupational pension eﬀects are no more sig-
niﬁcant. The validity of our instrument is conﬁrmed by its statistical signiﬁcance in
explaining pension choices as well as by an Hausman endogeneity test. These results
conﬁrm the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of pension choices, an issue
2that has been disregarded by most of the empirical literature. The additional ﬁnding
that workers participating to an occupational pension plan are signiﬁcantly less likely
to quit towards a non pension job can be interpreted as indirect evidence that they are
in ”good” jobs.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
structure of the UK pension system, focusing on its second pillar and on occupational
pensions portability regulation. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature. Section 4
introduces the empirical modelling framework. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6
illustrates the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Pension Choices and Portability Issues in the United King-
dom
The current UK pension system has a three tiered structure. The ﬁrst tier is public,
and consists of a basic ﬂat-rate pension as well as of a means-tested beneﬁt. The second
tier is mandatory and pension provision is split between the State - in the form of the
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) - and private companies - in the form
of occupational - employer sponsored - and personal pension schemes. Finally, there is
a third tier of voluntary private retirement saving.
The wide variety of retirement pension plans currently oﬀered in the UK is the result
3of a number of reforms undertaken over the last 25 years, whose main aim was to oﬀer
individuals a wider choice of retirement pension vehicles. Central to this strategy was
the ”contracting-out” mechanism, introduced originally in 1978 as a means of integrat-
ing existing occupational DB pension schemes into the SERPS.1 While employees with
earnings in excess of a ”lower earning limit” were automatically enrolled into SERPS,
initially they were also given the option of contracting-out into an approved deﬁned
beneﬁt (DB) occupational pension scheme.2 The 1986 Social Security Act extended
the contracting-out option to approved deﬁned contribution (DC) plans3 and to ap-
proved personal pensions.4 Moreover, any contractual membership requirement to an
employer’s scheme was abolished, while employees were allowed to ”opt out” from an
occupational plan to subscribe a personal pension.
Employers are not mandated to sponsor an occupational pension plan nor an ap-
proved occupational pension plan5, while employees can always decide to remain into
SERPS or to later reenter it. Finally, individuals can eventually top up their occu-
pational or personal pension with additional voluntary contributions or free-standing
additional voluntary contributions (up to the limits permitted by the Island Revenue).6
T a b l e s1a n d2r e p o r tﬁgures elaborated from the Occupational Pensions Schemes
Survey collected over the 90s by the Government Actuary.7 Table 1 indicates that there
4has been a downward trend in private sector occupational pension schemes’ member-
ship over the decade. Alternatively, the distribution of active members by type of plan
has remained relatively stable over time, with more than 80 percent of plan partici-
pants belonging to DB plans. Table 2 indicates that the level of contracting-out also
has been fairly stable over time, with more than 80 percent of private sector workers
participating to contracted-out plans. Most workers participate to contracted-out DB
plans - Contracted-Out Salary Related (COSR) schemes - while a minority of workers
participate to contracted-out DC plans - Contracted-Out Money Purchase (COMP)
schemes. A minority of workers participate to Contracted In Salary Related (CISR) or
Money Purchase (CIMP) schemes.
Pension regulation usually deﬁnes the standard portability options available to a
worker leaving an occupational pension plan before retirement age. According to this
general framework, pension portability rules in a pension plan deﬁne the rights of
early leavers. Typically, these rules provide that an individual is entitled to join a
pension plan only upon satisfaction of some eligibility condition (related to service, age
or employment status). Once eligible, workers joining an occupational pension plan
are usually required to complete a further vesting period before being entitled to any
pension rights’ accrual. Eligibility conditions and vesting periods apply to occupational
5pension plans independently of their DB/DC nature. While vesting periods are usually
short - e.g. 2 years in the UK - a more relevant portability issue is typically arising
in DB plans, because of their implicitly backloaded pension rights’ accrual structure.
The typical DB plan promises workers to pay a retirement pension annuity related
to the length of service and to the ﬁnal salary. In case a separation occurs before
retirement, vested workers are entitled to a deferred retirement pension determined on
the basis of earnings received upon leaving the ﬁrm. If deferred beneﬁts are not indexed
to inﬂation and to productivity growth even workers moving betweens ﬁrms oﬀering
identical DB plans and wage proﬁles will accumulate lower total pension beneﬁts than
workers remaining in the same ﬁrm throughout their career. The shortfall of actual
retirement beneﬁts from those that would have been paid if there had been no change
in scheme membership as a consequence of job separations during the worker career
represents the opportunity cost of leaving the current pension plan8.
In contrast, workers covered by DC arrangements have a legal claim on the individual
pension account in which all pension contributions have been invested. If the funds
remain in the account after the worker leaves the ﬁrm, the account will continue to
grow by the accumulated returns on invested assets. Alternatively, the funds can be
transferred to a diﬀerent occupational or personal pension plan. In either case, DC
6plans can be deﬁned as fully portable, given that a job changer retains the full value of
his/her pension account.
W h i l ei nt h eU Kt h e r ea r en o ts p e c i ﬁc legislative provision regarding eligibility con-
ditions to an occupational plan9, a number of legislative changes have contributed to
improve the situation of early leavers over the last 25 years. Before 1975, early leavers
had no legal right to transfer their accrued pension entitlements to a new scheme or
even to receive deferred beneﬁts from their old scheme. Under the current rules, the
vesting period is set at two years of pension plan membership. In particular, vested
early leavers from DB plans can have their accrued rights preserved in the pension
scheme as deferred beneﬁts, to be revalued until retirement guaranteeing a minimum
”limited price indexation” in line with the Retail Price Index, up to a maximum of 5
percent. Alternatively they can take a tax free transfer value to a diﬀerent occupational
pension scheme (either DB or DC) or to an approved personal pension or to purchase
a retirement annuity.
3L i t e r a t u r e
The impact of employer provided pension plans on individual job mobility choices has
been widely investigated in the US pension literature. While early empirical studies10
documented a signiﬁcant negative correlation between plan participation and job mo-
7bility, more recent literature has tried to explain this stylized fact using three main
arguments: pension portability losses arising to early leavers from DB plans11,c o m -
pensation premiums accruing to pension covered workers12 or the ”self-selection” of
”low discounters” into pension jobs13.
Evidence for the United Kingdom is essentially limited to ﬁve previous studies.
McCormick and Hughes (1984) use the 1974 General Household Survey (GHS) to
estimate ”intentions to quit” and turnover logit equations. While they explicitly derive
pension portability losses, their empirical speciﬁcation only contains a pension partici-
pation dummy and its interaction with job tenure. They ﬁnd that pension workers are
signiﬁcantly less likely to move, while the negative and signiﬁcant size of the interaction
term suggests that tenure matters only in pension jobs.
Henley, Disney and Carruth (1994) use the 1985 GHS to estimate hazard rates of
exit from jobs without distinguishing between exit routes. They ﬁnd that occupational
pension scheme membership signiﬁcantly decreases the hazard, while transferability
of pension rights increases it. They include a quadratic pension-tenure interaction
t e r mw h i c ht u r n so u tt ob en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant, conﬁrming the McCormick-Hughes
proposition that the pension loss function is time dependent and possibly non-linear.
Mealli and Pudney (1996) is the only study that takes into account the potential en-
8dogeneity of pension participation choices, although the use of the retrospective sample
design provided by the 1988-1989 Retirement Survey could undermine the accuracy of
their results. They analyze the role of unobserved individual speciﬁc characteristics in
explaining the relationship between pension coverage status and labor force transitions.
Estimating a random-eﬀects competing risks model they provide evidence of a strong
positive association between the length of job tenure and pension participation status,
while no role is found for unobservables. These ﬁndings run against the self-selection
hypothesis; however, the role of pension portability losses is not explicitly modelled.
In a recent paper14, we use data from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) survey to analyze the eﬀect of occupational pensions and pension portability
losses on interﬁrm job mobility within a switching regression framework. We ﬁnd that
UK workers participating to an occupational pension plan are signiﬁcantly less likely
to move, while pension portability losses do not seem to act as a signiﬁcant mobility
impediment. Rather, the ﬁnding of positive wage premiums accruing to occupational
pension workers is consistent with the view that the latters are less likely to leave
because they hold ”good” jobs.
A more recent study is provided by Disney and Emerson (2002) using BHPS data.
They ﬁnd that not only those workers who join an occupational pension plan oﬀered
9by their employer but also those who decline to join it have signiﬁcantly lower mobility
rates. Moreover, they also ﬁnd that employees contracting-out a personal pension have
signiﬁcantly lower mobility rates. Disney and Emerson (2002) suggest that these results
could be explained through diﬀerent selection processes inducing alternative pension
choices. However, their modelling approach does not account for the endogenous nature
of pension choices, therefore not providing a direct test of such selection arguments.
The contribution of the present paper to the existing pension literature is three-
fold. First, and most importantly, in the empirical modelling of job mobility behavior
we account for the endogeneity of pension schemes choice using instrumental variable
techniques. Second, we explicitly test the impact of pension portability losses on vol-
untary job mobility. Third, we exploit the richness of a data set that provides detailed
information on occupational and personal pension participation status and that follows
individuals over a relatively long time period. Indeed, our empirical approach fully
exploits the time varying dimension of the data.
4 Estimation Method
We are interested in modelling the length of the employment spell for individuals with
their current employer. Individuals in the sample are indexed by i =1 ,.....,n, while
the passage of calendar time is set in integer years. Year di =1is the year in which
10the respondent started working with the current employer (and is before the sample
selection year). Let di = ji index the sample selection year, which can be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent individuals. Each of the respondent is then interviewed approximately
one year later. If the individual subsequently moves we denote the length of the spell
running after the ﬁrst interview date by ki. So, the calendar time of a spell end is
denoted by di = ji + ki. Otherwise, ki denotes the censoring point at the end of the
observation window. Our panel is unbalanced in that we follow individuals until they are
no more observed in their ”current employment” spell, either because they experience
a job to job transition or because they drop out from the survey, or because they
experience a transition to another state (e.g. unemployment, out of the labour force).
While respondents experiencing a job to job transition before the end of the observation
window contribute complete duration data, all the others contribute censored duration
data, with censoring immediately before the end of the interval between two consecutive
waves. However, observations censored because they remained in the current employer
are still at risk of experiencing a transition during the observation period.
Suppose that job to job transitions are determined as discrete time counterparts to
an underlying continuous time proportional hazards model:
θi(t)=λ(t)exp(x0
itβ), (1)
11where λ(t) denotes the baseline hazard, xit is a vector of time variant/invariant ex-
planatory variables, and β is a vector of unknown coeﬃcients. The discrete time hazard
denotes the probability of the current employment spell being completed by time t+1,



















denotes the integrated baseline hazard. We do not specify any functional form for γ(t)
and estimate the model semiparametrically.
I no r d e rt oa v o i dt h eb i a sd e r i v i n gf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tw ea r eu s i n ga” s t o c ks a m p l i n g ”
rather than a ”ﬂow sampling” design, we need to condition transition rates on the length
of the spell at the ﬁrst interview date.15 The individual likelihood contribution can be
written as:






















where ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if di is uncensored and zero
12otherwise.
The model outlined speciﬁes the likelihood of a single risk: the overall job to job
transition. We are however interested in distinguishing observed transitions on the basis
of their cause (voluntary/involuntary) and, for voluntary transitions, on the basis of
their destination state (occupational pension covered/not covered job). We estimate the
parameters of a given cause-speciﬁc hazard by treating spells ending for other reasons
as censored at the time of exit.
The simple hazard model speciﬁcation includes among the regressors four dummy
variables indicating pension schemes participation status. However, if the latter reﬂects
workers’ choices, neglecting this endogeneity will introduce bias in our estimates. We
deal with this problem using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.
In general, IV estimation requires at least one explanatory variable satisfying an
exclusion restriction which is directly related to the identiﬁcation issue: the variable
used as an instrument must not have any direct inﬂuence on the outcome variable,
while any inﬂuence on it should be only indirect through the instrumented explanatory
variable. When discussing IV estimation methods the focus is usually on linear outcome
equations. In our case we deal with a nonlinear outcome equation. As Sueyoshi (1995)
demonstrate, the discrete hazard rate model can be interpreted as a special case of a
13binary choice model. This implies that it is not strictly required to impose an exclusion
restriction as identiﬁcation is guaranteed by means of nonlinearities of the functional
form, although the availability of a valid instrument makes identiﬁcation indipendent
of functional form assumptions.
Consistent two step estimation in the resulting class of simultaneous probability
models has been discussed by Mallar (1977) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996).
Recent applications include Dearden, Machin, Reed and Wilkinson (1997), Veum (1997)
and Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1999). They all estimate probit models to obtain
individual training participation propensities which are then used to instrument the
potentially endogenous training variables.
We follow a similar approach, estimating probit equations for the available pension
choices, where workers that have not been oﬀered an occupational pension plan and that
do not contract-out a personal pension are kept as the reference category . Predicted
probabilities are then computed for each pension choice equation and substituted for
the pension participation dummies in the hazard rate equations. The standard errors
in the IV hazard outcome equations are bootstrapped in order to account for ﬁrst-step
estimation.16 Identiﬁcation of the hazard IV models is achieved through an exclusion
restriction. In particular, we exploit the exogenous variation provided by a derived
14variable representing the occupational pension oﬀer rate by industry, union coverage
and ﬁrm size, as tabulated in Table 3. Such a variable is included in the pension
choice equations while being excluded from the job to job transition hazards. The
occupational pension oﬀer rate is expected to bear a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
with occupational pension coverage and participation, while being unrelated to job
turnover.
5D a t a
The data used in the analysis are from waves 1 to 9 of the British Hosehold Panel Survey
(BHPS). The ﬁrst wave, carried out in the autumn of 1991, covered a nationally rep-
resentative random sample of the UK population consisting of about 5.500 households
and 10.000 individuals. The original respondents, as well as any adult co-residents,
were then followed over time through annual interviews usually conducted each year
from September to April of the following year.
We have selected a stock sample of private - non agricultural, no construction - sector
full time male employees aged 20 to 50 at the time they are ﬁr s to b s e r v e di nf u l lt i m e
employment. The upper age limit is set at 50 in order to avoid sample selection related
to retirement, while the analysis excludes females because they usually have diﬀerent
employment and job mobility patterns. We follow the individuals in our sample until
15they separate from their current employer. In order to observe transitions, the minimum
data requirement is that individuals are interviewed at least in two consecutive waves.
The BHPS collects detailed information on individuals’ job related and socio-economic
characteristics. Working age individuals are asked to complete an employment history
each year looking back over the previous year, and from these histories it is possible
to identify the end of an employment spell and the motivations behind it. We deﬁne a
quit, or voluntary separation, as a job separation motivated by the take up of a better
j o bw i t had i ﬀerent employer as well as by other personal related reasons. Layoﬀs,
or involuntary separations, are consequently deﬁned as a residual category containing
individuals dismissed from their job or completing a temporary contract.
Workers participating to an occupational pension scheme usually have to leave it
while changing employer. The BHPS contains a number of questions about employees’
pension arrangements. Employees are asked if their current employer runs a pension
scheme for which they are eligible and if they participate to it.17 In addition, from
t h es e c o n dw a v eo n w a r d sa l lr e s p o n d e n t sa r ea s k e di ft h e yh a v es u b s c r i b e dap e r s o n a l
pension plan and its starting date. Through the latter question we can deﬁne personal
pension participation in the ﬁrst wave of the survey as well. A limitation of the BHPS
is that it does not provide any description of occupational pension plan characteristics
16(including their DB/DC nature). The calculation of pension portability losses, included
as a control in one of the model’s speciﬁcations, is then based on the features of the
typical UK private sector DB occupational plan, as reported in Table 4. This assump-
tion should be a reasonable approximation, given the low proportion of workers covered
by DC plans, and given that the tight regulation and market competition have led to
a considerable degree of similarity between the features of most DB schemes.18
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Determinants of Pension Choices
Table 5 reports the participation rates of private sector male employees when ﬁrst
observed in our sample. About three quarters of private sector full time employees
are oﬀered an occupational pension plan, while the take-up rate is only 61 percent.19
More than half of those who decline to join opt out for a personal pension. Workers
not oﬀered an occupational pension are found to be equally divided in two further
categories: those that contracted-out a personal pension, and those who decide to stay
into SERPS. Table 6 indicates that workers belonging to the ﬁve second tier pension
arrangements are diﬀerent along many observable dimensions. In particular, workers
who joined an occupational pension plan earn the highest net hourly wages, are the
most likely to be union member, to have a degree, to be managers and to be in large
17ﬁrms. These diﬀerences are conﬁrmed in the probit regression estimates reported in
Table 7, where workers not oﬀered an occupational plan and not contracting out a
personal pension are kept as the reference category.20 Column 1 shows that union
members, managers and white collar workers, as well as savers are signiﬁcantly more
likely to join an occupational pension plan. Alternatively, column 2 indicates that union
members, higher educated and savers are less likely to decline to join an oﬀered plan
and to stay into SERPS, while vocational qualiﬁcation and household size display an
opposite eﬀect. These estimates will be used later in the IV estimation procedure. In
this respect, the results reported in Table 7 conﬁrm the validity of our instrument -
the pension oﬀer rate - in explaining signiﬁcantly the decision to join an occupational
pension plan as well as the decision to contract-out a personal pension.
6.2 Pension Participation and Job Mobility
Table 8 summarizes job turnover, quits and layoﬀs over the observation period by
pension participation status. The distinction between quits and layoﬀsi sp a r t i c u l a r l y
important to our purposes. The negative link between occupational pension participa-
tion and voluntary mobility is a well established ﬁnding in the US empirical literature,
although the causes of such a relationship are still debated. The pension literature
has also documented a negative relationship between employer provided pensions and
18layoﬀs.21 The latter ﬁnding has been motivated with the implicit nature of the pension
contract acting as a ﬁring constraint for the ﬁrm, through the reputation costs that
would arise upon breaking the implicit contract. Figures from Table 8 conﬁrm these
stylized facts also for the UK. In our sample, the quit rate of workers participating to
an occupational pension plan is about 4 times lower of that of workers not oﬀered an
occupational pension arrangement and staying into SERPS. It is interesting to note
that also workers who decline to join an occupational pension plan oﬀered by their
employer as well as workers contracting-out a personal pension have lower quit rates
than those in the reference category. The link between pension scheme participation
and layoﬀs follows a similar pattern, although it appears to be weaker.
The above results are suggestive of a negative correlation among occupational pen-
sion participation and job mobility. However, a multivariate analysis is needed in order
to assess if there is any causality link.
Tables 9 and 10 report the results obtained from estimation of the hazard models for
job turnover, quits and layoﬀs. The hazard rates are conditioned on observable time
constant as well as time varying covariates that can be grouped in three categories:
• personal and household characteristics: include a marital status dummy (refer-
ence: married), age at the ﬁrst interview, number of children, household size and
19income, 3 education dummies (degree, a-level, o-level; reference: lower education),
a vocational qualiﬁcation dummy (reference: no qualiﬁcation), 5 region dummies
(London, East, West-North, Scotland; reference: South and Wales), 3 housing
tenure dummies (house owner outright, private rental, subsidized rental; reference:
house owner with mortgage), a dummy for spouse employment status (reference:
spouse not employed or not married), experience and experience squared;
• job speciﬁc characteristics: include net hourly wage, travel time to work, 2 occu-
pation dummies (manager and professional, white collar worker; reference: blue
collar worker), 2 worker’s supervisory status dummies (managerial, supervisor; ref-
erence: no supervisory role), 2 industry dummies (distribution, services; reference:
manufacturing), a union membership dummy (reference: not member), 2 ﬁrm size
dummies (large, medium, reference: small);
• pension variables: include pension portability loss computed for workers enrolled in
an occupational DB plan and 4 dummies indicating workers’ pension participation
status (joins an occupational pension plan, does not join the plan oﬀered opting
out for a personal pension, does not join the plan oﬀe r e dr e m a i n i n gi n t oS E R P S ,
contracts-out a personal pension; reference: is not oﬀered an occupational pension
plan, and remains into SERPS).
20We assume a ﬂexible ”semiparametric” piece-wise form for the baseline hazard. Du-
ration dependence is captured through 11 job duration dummies, one for each of the
ﬁrst ten years and a further dummy that groups durations over 10 years.
The coeﬃcients reported in Tables 9 and 10 describe the impact of the regressors
on the "simple" hazard rate model. The model is estimated under two speciﬁcation,
the second one (corresponding to the last three columns) including pension portability
losses among the regressors. We focus on the results of the quit hazards which are of
main interest for this paper.
The baseline quit hazard estimates, reported in Table 10 show a non-monotonic
shape. Until the 3rd year, the hazard is monotonically decreasing. Upward spikes are
found at the 4th and 6th year of the spell, while thereafter the baseline hazard takes
again a monotonically decreasing shape. However, the coeﬃcients of the baseline hazard
are never signiﬁcant at standard levels.
Results from the second column of Table 9 indicate that in the simple model house-
hold size and travel time to work aﬀect positively and signiﬁcantly the quit hazard
rates, while workers not married, with dependent children and in medium ﬁrms are
found to be less likely to quit at the 10 percent level. Importantly, we ﬁnd that not
only workers participating to occupational pension plans but also workers that although
21being oﬀered an occupational pension plan decide not to join, either opting out for a
personal pension or staying into SERPS, are signiﬁcantly less likely to quit. These
ﬁndings are consistent with those provided by Disney and Emerson (2002) although
they use a diﬀerent sample (including females and public employees) and a diﬀerent
modelling approach. Our results are robust to the inclusion of pension portability losses
among the regressors. Indeed, the likelihood does not improve very much and pension
portability loss does not bear a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on hazard rates.
While looking at the impact of occupational pension participation on quits, it can
be important to diﬀerentiate between transitions in and out of occupational pension
jobs, in contrast to transitions between occupational pension jobs that involve a change
of pension plan. In particular, if occupational pension jobs also oﬀer higher wages, this
fact can in itself be a strong deterrent to quit, and should be separated from the costs
arising from moving between occupational pension jobs associated with non-portability
of pensions. Higher wages oﬀered by occupational pension jobs can also explain why
individuals choose jobs oﬀering an occupational pension scheme even if they later decide
not to join the scheme.
In Tables 11 and 12 we report the hazard rate estimates of a second competing
risk model which focuses on quits distinguishing between occupational pension/ non
22occupational pension jobs as destination states. The most interesting ﬁnding is that
second tier pension schemes arrangements have a marginally signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on quits towards an occupational pension job. Alternatively, workers participating to
occupational pension plans as well as workers that have not joined an occupational
pension plan are signiﬁcantly less likely to move voluntarily to a non pension job.
Importantly, pension portability losses are not statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels.
These results can be interpreted as indirect evidence that occupational pension jobs are
better jobs, and therefore covered workers are not keen to quit for a non pension job.
The results presented above, as well as those provided by Disney and Emerson (2002),
are conditional on treating pension participation status as exogenously assigned. In the
UK context, characterized by the availability of extensive pension choices to individu-
als, this assumption seems too strong. We therefore account for pension endogeneity
including in the hazard model the predicted pension scheme choice generated using the
pension choice probits estimates reported in Table 7. We estimate the IV model using
only the speciﬁcation that excludes the pension portability loss, given that the latter
was never found to be signiﬁcant in the "simple" hazard model estimates.22
The results for the hazard IV quit models, reported in Tables 13 and 14, are quite
similar to those of the simple hazard models for all the variables but for the pension
23participation ones. The occupational pension participation dummies in the aggregate
q u i te q u a t i o n-r e p o r t e di nc o l u m n1-a r en om o r es i g n i ﬁcant, while now workers
contracting-out a personal pension are signiﬁcantly more likely to move. Alternatively,
IV hazards estimates of quits to an occupational or to a non occupational pension job -
reported in Column 2 and 3 of Table 11 respectively - indicate that among the pension
participation dummies only the occupational pension participation one preserves its sign
and signiﬁcance. To conﬁrm the validity of our instruments, we test the exogeneity of
pension participation status in the mobility hazards using the method developed by
Hausman (1978). This method involves estimating a speciﬁcation of the hazards which
includes both the actual and the predicted values of pension scheme choices as regressors
and testing the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the predicted values are equal
to zero. The test statistic obtained allow to reject exogeneity at standard signiﬁcance
levels.23
The IV results indicate that the negative relationship between occupational pension
schemes dummies and voluntary job mobility can be due to spurious correlation. If
this was really the case, we could conclude that the results provided by the previous
literature are biased.
247 Conclusions
This paper analyzes job to job transitions of private sector male employees in the
United Kingdom. The aim is to evaluate the relative impact of second tier pension
schemes choice and portability rules on voluntary job mobility. We ﬁnd that the eﬀects
of pension schemes participation on job mobility hazards change signiﬁcantly while
moving from the simple hazard model to the instrumental variable hazard model. In
the former, workers either oﬀered and participating or oﬀered but not participating
to an occupational pension plan have signiﬁcantly lower quit rates. However, once
endogeneity is accounted for these eﬀects are no more signiﬁcant. Alternatively, the
eﬀect of pension portability losses on transition rates is never signiﬁcant. These results
seem to indicate that the negative relationship between occupational pension schemes
participation and voluntary job mobility is due to spurious correlation and conﬁrm
the importance of taking into account of the endogeneity of pension choices, an issue
that is disregarded by most of the empirical literature. From a policy perspective,
our results cast doubts on the eﬀectiveness of pension portability reforms on fostering
labour mobility, suggesting that the lower job mobility rate of pension covered workers
may be attributed to a better quality of these jobs (e. g. in terms of wage rates) rather
than to the costs associated with pension portability losses.
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29Notes
1SERPS was introduced by the 1975 Social Security Act to supplement the basic ﬂat rate public
pension. Originally, it was paying a pension corresponding to one quarter of employees earnings’
between a lower and an upper limit from the best twenty working years. Earnings were to be uprated
by growth in average earnings until retirement age, and pension payments were indexed to prices.
The Social Security Act of 1986 reduced the generosity of SERPS by lowering the payments to twenty
percent of employees average earnings’, calculated over the entire working life.
2In a DB plan workers’ pension beneﬁts are determined on the basis of an accrual rate, years of
plan participation and ﬁnal salary.
3In a DC plan an individual account is opened for each worker, and contributions to the account
are usually invested in ﬁnancial assets.
4Personal pensions are individual DC pension accounts oﬀered by ﬁnancial institutions and usually
not linked to a particular employer, although employers can sponsor group personal pension plans.
5Employers can sponsor a "contracted-in" occupational pension scheme supplementing, rather then
substituting, SERPS pension beneﬁts.
6Individuals can participate to occupational and personal pension schemes at the same time only
if the occupational scheme is "contracted-in" or if the personal pension scheme is used to receive a
transfer payments from a previous scheme.
7Government Actuary’s Department (1995, 2001, 2003).
8Andrietti (forthcoming) provides details on the pension loss computation methodology.
9Most occupational pension plans in the UK do not apply a waiting period, while it is common
to require a minimum entry age for plan membership or minimum working hours. See Government
Actuary’s Department (1995).
10See Mitchell (1983) among others.
11Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988), Andrietti and Hildebrand (2001).
12Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), Andrietti and Hildebrand (2001).
13Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993), Ippolito (1997).
14Andrietti (forthcoming).
15See Jenkins (1995).
16We use 1.000 repetitions for the bootstrapping procedure.
17However, individuals are not asked whether their employer oﬀers them an occupational pension
scheme. Rather, they are asked about any pension scheme oﬀered by their employer. This might
30include people who are oﬀered group personal pension schemes. We should be able to identify these
people since they are likely to report that they are oﬀered a pension scheme to which they belong and
that they have a personal pension. We then classify anyone who reports having a personal pension as
not having an occupational pension.
18See Government Actuary’s Department (1995, 2001, 2003).
19The diﬀerences with the oﬃcial ﬁgures provided by the Government Actuary’s Department (1995,
2001, 2003) come from the fact that the sample we use as the base for our statistics has a more
restricted age range and excludes females as well as construction industries and part time employees.
20We do not report the results obtained for the following variables: age squared, experience squared,
travel to work time, household size and income, and dummies for geographical location (4), housing
tenure (3), supervisory role (2) and job tenure (10). The estimated coeﬃcients have been transformed
into marginal eﬀects; t−values are reported in parenthesis, while the coeﬃcients’ statistical signiﬁcance
is indicated with one (90 percent) or two (95 percent) asterisks. The complete set of results is available
upon request from the author.
21Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988, 1993) and Dorsey, Cornwell and Mehrzad (1993).
22We also tried to endogenize the pension loss instrumenting it through a tobit estimator, but the
results were similar to the ones presented here.
23As a further check of the validity of our instrument, we reestimated the quit hazards endogenizing
only the pension choices that were found to be explained signiﬁcantly by our instrument. We found
no signiﬁcant changes in the results. The results of this test and of the Hausman test are available
upon request from the author.
31Table 1: Private Sector Scheme Active Members by Plan Type
1991 1995 2000
Millions % Millions % Millions %
DB Plans 5.3 81.5 4.87 80 4.6 80.7
DC Plans 1 14.3 1.1 18 0.9 15.7
Hybrid Plans 0.2 4.7 0.3 4.9 0.2 3.5
Total Active Members 6.5 100 6.2 100 5.7 100
Private Sector Workers 15.8 16 17
OP Members in % of Private Sector Workers 40 39 36
Source: Government Actuary’s Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
32Table 2: Private Sector Scheme Active Members by Plan Type and Contracting Out Status
1991 1995 2000
Millions % Millions % Millions %
DB Plans
COSR 4.6 90.2 4.13 87.3 4.1 89.1
CISR 0.5 9.8 0.57 12.7 0.5 10.9
DC Plans
COMP 0.4 44.4 0.46 42 0.3 33.3
CIMP 0.5 55.6 0.64 58 0.6 66.7
Total contracting-out 5 84 4.6 80 4.4 83
Source: Government Actuary’s Department (1995, 2001, 2003)
33Table 3: Pension Oﬀer Rate by Firm Size, Industry and Union Coverage
Manufacturing Distribution Services
Union No Union Union No Union Union No Union
Small Firm 51.2 80 49.1 81.8 49.1 84.7
Medium Firm 80.4 93 77.8 100 73.5 92.1
Large Firm 81.8 98.1 100 100 80 96.4
Source: BHPS, waves 1-9
34Table 4: Assumptions for Portability Loss Computation
Annual Accrual Rate 1/60
Pensionable Wage Final Wage
Normal Retirement Age 60
Expected Inﬂation Rate 3%
Expected Nominal Wage Growth Rate 5%
Post-Retirement Indexation 3%
Early Leavers’ Indexation 3%
Nominal Discount Rate 5%
Inﬂation Adjusted Discount Rate 2%
35Table 5: Occupational Pension Schemes Coverage and Participation
Oﬀered OP 74.32
Oﬀered OP - joined 60.96
Oﬀered OP - not joined - PP 7.24
Oﬀered OP - not joined - SERPS 6.12
Not Oﬀered OP 25.68
Not Oﬀered OP - PP 12.84
Not Oﬀered OP - SERPS 12.84
Sample Size 981
Source: BHPS, waves 1-9
36Table 6: Summary Statistics (Mean) by Occupational Pension Status
OP-J. OP-No J.-PP OP-No J.-SERPS NO OP-PP NO OP-SERPS
Not Married (%) 11.7 21.1 18.3 16.7 19
Age 39.2 38.4 38.7 38.9 37.6
Children 1 .77 1.12 .82 .98
Household Size 3.3 2.8 3.5 3.1 3.3
Spouse Employed (%) 68.4 66.2 55 67.5 58.7
Union Member (%) 44.5 28.2 26.7 10.3 8.7
Manager & Professional (%) 35.1 23.9 13.3 24.6 16.7
White Collar Worker (%) 19.7 15.5 21.7 13.5 11.9
Medium Firm (%) 34.3 33.8 43.3 17.5 15.1
Large Firm (%) 26.6 12.7 20 3.2 7.1
Experience 22.9 22.4 22.9 23 21.5
Job Tenure 8.5 5.8 5.8 5.7 4.4
Distribution (%) 11.9 22.5 16.7 26.2 23.8
Services (%) 29.3 22.5 23.3 25.4 38.9
Education: Degree (%) 20.7 15.5 6.7 11.9 10.3
Education: A Level (%) 29.6 31 31.2 25.4 23.8
Education: O Level (%) 26.4 26.8 25 28.6 31.7
Net Wage 6.66 6.03 5.21 5.38 4.92
Saver (%) 60.7 40.8 36.7 52.4 36.5
Pension Oﬀer Rate 79.8 72.3 77.9 59.3 61.1
Sample Size 598 71 60 126 126
37Table 7: Probit Estimates of Occupational Pension Choices
OP-J. OP-NO J.-PP OP-NO J.-SERPS NO OP-PP
Not Married -0.061 0.022 0.022 0.014
(0.85) (0.63) (0.82) (0.39)
Age 0.093 0.023 0.004 0.013
(0.81) (0.44) (0.10) (0.24)
Children 0.043 0.014 -0.007 -0.004
(1.33) (0.94) (0.81) (0.23)
Household Size -0.025 -0.029** 0.017** -0.004
(0.91) (2.28) (2.25) (0.30)
Spouse Employed 0.025 0.019 -0.016 0.004
(0.52) (0.94) (1.11) (0.19)
Union Member 0.196** -0.009 -0.024* -0.012
(3.68) (0.40) (1.87) (0.35)
Manager & Professional 0.157** -0.020 -0.014 -0.019
(2.76) (0.34) (0.81) (0.66)
White Collar Worker 0.137** -0.017 0.012 -0.033
(2.69) (0.89) (0.78) (1.39)
Medium Firm 0.014 -0.005 0.018 0.028
(0.21) (0.21) (0.91) (0.72)
Large Firm 0.047 -0.033 0.012 -0.006
(0.58) (1.22) (0.48) (0.13)
Experience -0.075 0.013 -0.004 -0.003
(1.26) (0.48) (0.17) (0.12)
Distribution -0.030 0.021 -0.000 -0.016
(0.58) (0.99) (0.02) (0.71)
Services -0.030 -0.022 -0.008 -0.012
(0.68) (1.34) (0.68) (0.60)
Education: Degree 0.107 0.009 -0.033* -0.002
(1.41) (0.27) (1.83) (0.06)
Education: A Level 0.072 0.015 -0.010 -0.022
(1.21) (0.60) (0.65) (0.78)
Education: O Level 0.045 0.010 -0.019 -0.007
(0.83) (0.43) (1.36) (0.29)
Vocational Qualiﬁcation -0.061 -0.005 0.024* 0.000
(1.46) (0.29) (1.87) (0.00)
Net Wage 0.014 0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(1.37) (0.87) (0.70) (0.96)
Saver 0.097** -0.031** -0.021* 0.022
(2.67) (2.08) (1.90) (1.28)
Occup. Pension Oﬀer Rate 0.006** 0.001 0.001 -0.005**
(3.09) (0.78) (1.21) (3.87)
Log Likelihood 486.7 227.17 189.2 301.72
Observed P 60.96 7.24 6.1 13.05
Predicted P at (¯ x) 64.51 5.08 3.1 7.54
Sample Size 981
38Table 8: Job Mobility Rates by Occupational Pension Choice
All Quit Layoﬀ
OP Member 5.58 2.81 2.77
Oﬀered OP, No Joined-PP 7.35 4.08 3.27
Oﬀered OP, No Joined-SERPS 8.46 4.48 3.98
Not Oﬀered OP-PP 10.78 7.53 3.44
Not Oﬀered OP-SERPS 18.50 11.36 7.14
Number of Observations 4.104
Base: Sample of Private Sector Male Employees Aged 20-50
Source: BHPS waves 1-9.
39Table 9: Hazard Rates for Job to Job Transitions
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
All Quit Layoﬀ All Quit Layoﬀ
Not Married -0.331 -0.691* -0.005 -0.331 -0.695* -0.007
(1.26) (1.81) (0.01) (1.26) (1.82) (0.02)
Age -0.368 -0.162 -0.453 -0.379 -0.190 -0.447
(1.17) (0.38) (0.96) (1.21) (0.45) (0.95)
Children -0.083 -0.181 0.067 -0.087 -0.193 0.066
(0.83) (1.42) (0.44) (0.87) (1.50) (0.43)
Household Size 0.139 0.244** 0.008 0.141 0.250** 0.009
(1.61) (2.23) (0.06) (1.64) (2.27) (0.07)
Spouse Employed -0.158 -0.072 -0.233 -0.152 -0.057 -0.234
(0.94) (0.33) (0.94) (0.90) (0.25) (0.94)
Travel Time to Work 0.009** 0.010** 0.007** 0.009** 0.010** 0.007**
(4.13) (3.44) (2.30) (4.15) (3.46) (2.29)
Union Member 0.099 -0.130 0.321 0.095 -0.136 0.325
(0.62) (0.58) (1.44) (0.60) (0.61) (1.46)
Manager & Professional 0.152 0.165 0.132 0.161 0.182 0.129
(0.72) (0.59) (0.42) (0.75) (0.65) (0.41)
White Collar Workers 0.124 -0.025 0.257 0.125 -0.021 0.257
(0.64) (0.10) (0.96) (0.65) (0.08) (0.96)
Medium Firm -0.209 -0.369* -0.008 -0.210 -0.375* -0.010
(1.32) (1.70) (0.04) (1.33) (1.73) (0.04)
Large Firm -0.133 -0.144 -0.076 -0.133 -0.145 -0.074
(0.71) (0.57) (0.28) (0.71) (0.57) (0.28)
Experience 0.187 0.105 0.230 0.186 0.109 0.233
(1.15) (0.51) (0.90) (1.15) (0.53) (0.91)
Experience Squared -0.005 -0.001 -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.008
(1.42) (0.18) (1.61) (1.43) (0.21) (1.61)
Distribution 0.169 0.306 -0.036 0.163 0.295 -0.033
(0.96) (1.36) (0.13) (0.93) (1.31) (0.12)
Services -0.198 0.160 -0.621** -0.202 0.154 -0.619**
(1.26) (0.79) (2.59) (1.28) (0.76) (2.58)
Education: Degree -0.371 0.022 -0.864** -0.351 0.067 -0.868**
(1.40) (0.06) (2.09) (1.32) (0.20) (2.10)
Education: A level -0.112 -0.060 -0.088 -0.098 -0.029 -0.089
(0.53) (0.21) (0.29) (0.46) (0.10) (0.30)
Education: O Level -0.464** -0.465* -0.387 -0.454* -0.439 -0.385
(2.34) (1.73) (1.39) (2.29) (1.62) (1.38)
Vocational Qualiﬁcation 0.123 0.257 -0.033 0.120 0.245 -0.035
(0.83) (1.31) (0.15) (0.81) (1.25) (0.16)
Net Wage -0.035 -0.021 -0.071 -0.043 -0.030 -0.066
(1.21) (0.58) (1.43) (1.33) (0.77) (1.25)
Saver 0.021 0.094 -0.037 0.022 0.094 -0.039
(0.15) (0.54) (0.19) (0.17) (0.54) (0.20)
OP-Joined -0.972** -1.040** -0.741** -1.00** -1.073** -0.707**
(4.72) (3.91) (2.47) (4.75) (3.98) (2.24)
OP-No Joined-PP -0.836** -0.763* -0.770* -0.829** -0.751* -0.779*
(2.77) (1.94) (1.75) (2.74) (1.90) (1.77)
OP-No Joined-SERPS -0.817** -0.862** -0.597 -0.812** -0.850** -0.601
(2.62) (2.10) (1.33) (2.60) (2.06) (1.34)
NO OP-PP -0.389* -0.180 -0.653* -0.378* -0.160 -0.662*
(1.74) (0.66) (1.85) (1.69) (0.58) (1.87)
Portability Loss 0.037 0.055 -0.040
(0.65) (0.84) (0.33)
Log Likelihood 987.65 618.6 548 987.45 618.27 548
Spells Ended from Risk 304 170 134 304 170 134
Sample Size 4.104 4.104 4.104 4.104 4.104 4.104
40Table 10: Semiparametric Baseline Hazard: Job to Job Transitions
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
All Quit Layoﬀ All Quit Layoﬀ
dur1 4.304 1.237 3.43 4.559 1.767 3.272
(0.92) (0.20) (0.49) (0.97) (0.28) (0.47)
dur2 3.701 0.379 3.32 3.958 0.917 3.165
(0.79) (0.06) (0.48) (0.85) (0.15) (0.45)
dur3 3.270 0.254 2.613 3.523 0.785 2.458
(0.70) (0.04) (0.38) (0.75) (0.12) (0.35)
dur4 3.403 0.777 1.865 3.656 1.310 1.712
(0.73) (0.12) (0.27) (0.78) (0.21) (0.25)
dur5 3.119 0.113 2.446 3.369 0.639 2.296
(0.67) (0.02) (0.35) (0.72) (0.10) (0.33)
dur6 3.373 0.466 2.566 3.619 0.988 2.419
(0.72) (0.07) (0.37) (0.77) (0.16) (0.35)
dur7 2.936 0.153 1.992 3.181 0.674 1.848
(0.63) (0.02) (0.29) (0.68) (0.11) (0.26)
dur8 2.606 -0.042 1.33 2.848 0.473 1.189
(0.56) (0.01) (0.20) (0.61) (0.08) (0.17)
dur9 2.617 -0.053 1.4 2.856 0.460 1.267
(0.56) (0.01) (0.20) (0.61) (0.07) (0.18)
dur10 2.521 -0.226 1.51 2.757 0.283 1.380
(0.54) (0.04) (0.22) (0.59) (0.04) (0.20)
dur10+ 2.625 -0.605 2.10 2.823 -0.163 2.005
(0.56) (0.10) (0.30) (0.60) (0.03) (0.29)
41Table 11: Hazard Rates for Voluntary Job to Job Transitions
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Quit OP Quit NOP Quit OP Quit NOP
Not Married -0.753 -0.706 -0.755 -0.711
(1.21) (1.41) (1.21) (1.42)
Age 0.086 -0.618 0.105 -0.656
(0.15) (0.96) (0.19) (1.01)
Children -0.051 -0.250 -0.053 -0.263
(0.22) (1.55) (0.22) (1.61)
Household Size 0.005 0.407** 0.008 0.412**
(0.03) (2.94) (0.04) (2.96)
Spouse Employed 0.205 -0.147 0.202 -0.130
(0.57) (0.50) (0.56) (0.44)
Travel Time to Work 0.006 0.014** 0.006 0.014**
(1.24) (3.83) (1.25) (3.86)
Union Member -0.063 -0.253 -0.056 -0.258
(0.21) (0.75) (0.19) (0.77)
Manager & Professional 0.581 -0.161 0.573 -0.140
(1.40) (0.42) (1.38) (0.36)
White Collar 0.470 -0.485 0.464 -0.477
(1.26) (1.24) (1.25) (1.22)
Medium Firm -0.387 -0.328 -0.387 -0.338
(1.22) (1.10) (1.22) (1.13)
Large Firm 0.056 -0.631 0.064 -0.625
(0.17) (1.44) (0.20) (1.43)
Experience 0.088 0.287 0.088 0.293
(0.35) (0.86) (0.35) (0.88)
Experience Squared -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.53) (0.16) (0.53) (0.20)
Distribution -0.689 0.896** -0.681 0.878**
(1.65) (3.07) (1.63) (3.00)
Services -0.202 0.551* -0.204 0.533
(0.70) (1.93) (0.70) (1.85)
Education: Degree -0.660 0.596 -0.675 0.647
(1.29) (1.29) (1.31) (1.38)
Education: A Level -0.752* 0.433 -0.764* 0.466
(1.74) (1.16) (1.77) (1.24)
Education: O Level -0.630 -0.427 -0.642 -0.395
(1.58) (1.15) (1.61) (1.05)
Vocational Qualiﬁcation -0.020 0.466* -0.018 0.451
(0.07) (1.71) (0.06) (1.65)
Net Wage -0.007 -0.004 0.005 -0.014
(0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.29)
Saver 0.186 -0.019 0.187 -0.022
(0.70) (0.08) (0.71) (0.09)
OP Joined 1.052 -1.942 1.120* -1.970**
(1.64) (5.71)** (1.71) (5.73)
OP No Joined-PP 1.425* -1.661** 1.392* -1.655**
(1.93) (2.90) (1.88) (2.89)
OP-No Joined-SERPS 1.338* -1.686** 1.319* -1.673**
(1.75) (2.92) (1.73) (2.89)
NO OP-PP 1.046 -0.447 1.012 -0.432
(1.56) (1.44) (1.50) (1.38)
Portability Loss -0.101 0.048
(0.54) (0.65)
Log Likelihood 330.1 353.9 330 353.7
Spells Ended from Risk 72 98 72 98
Sample Size 4.104 4.104 4.104 4.104
42Table 12: Semiparametric Baseline Hazard: Voluntary Job to Job Transitions
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Quit OP Quit NOP Quit OP Quit NOP
dur1 -6.206 8.244 -6.670 8.940
(0.71) (0.89) (0.76) (0.96)
dur2 -6.123 6.772 -6.595 7.478
(0.70) (0.73) (0.75) (0.80)
dur3 -6.612 6.984 -7.073 7.684
(0.76) (0.75) (0.81) (0.82)
dur4 -6.150 7.578 -6.601 8.285
(0.70) (0.82) (0.75) (0.89)
dur5 -6.945 7.076 -7.383 7.773
(0.79) (0.76) (0.84) (0.83)
dur6 -6.746 7.529 -7.171 8.226
(0.77) (0.81) (0.82) (0.88)
dur7 -7.375 7.403 -7.787 8.103
(0.84) (0.80) (0.89) (0.87)
dur8 -6.820 6.546 -7.219 7.241
(0.78) (0.70) (0.82) (0.77)
dur9 -7.669 7.196 -8.058 7.891
(0.87) (0.77) (0.91) (0.84)
dur10 -6.835 6.089 -7.211 6.784
(0.78) (0.65) (0.82) (0.72)
dur10+ -7.606 6.247 -7.882 6.882
(0.87) (0.67) (0.90) (0.74)
43Table 13: Hazard Rates for Voluntary Job to Job Transitions. IV Model, Spec. 1
Quit Quit OP Quit NOP
Not Married -0.607 -0.583 -0.756
(1.57) (0.92) (1.51)
Age -0.261 0.124 -0.551
(0.61) (0.21) (0.85)
Children -0.225* -0.077 -0.294*
(1.75) (0.32) (1.81)
Household Size 0.292** -0.052 0.476**
(2.36) (0.23) (3.01)
Spouse Employed -0.078 0.209 -0.216
(0.35) (0.58) (0.75)
Travel Time to Work 0.009** 0.006 0.012**
(3.03) (1.32) (3.17)
Union Member -0.101 -0.623 0.278
(0.36) (1.62) (0.66)
Manager & Professional 0.148 0.206 0.200
(0.50) (0.47) (0.49)
White Collars -0.069 0.200 -0.315
(0.26) (0.51) (0.78)
Medium Firm -0.305 -0.580* -0.025
(1.26) (1.66) (0.08)
Large Firm -0.059 -0.296 -0.222
(0.21) (0.80) (0.47)
Experience 0.144 0.192 0.160
(0.69) (0.71) (0.48)
Experience Squared -0.002 -0.005 0.000
(0.44) (0.80) (0.01)
Distribution 0.293 -0.445 0.720**
(1.29) (1.05) (2.47)
Services 0.237 -0.167 0.669**
(1.11) (0.53) (2.22)
Education: Degree -0.056 -0.935 0.681
(0.15) (1.74) (1.34)
Education: A Level -0.036 -0.863 0.577
(0.12) (1.94) (1.46)
Education: O Level -0.438 -0.752 -0.253
(1.57) (1.85) (0.66)
Vocational Qualiﬁcation 0.293 0.116 0.429
(1.43) (0.39) (1.50)
Net Wage -0.015 -0.023 0.010
(0.40) (0.33) (0.25)
Saver -0.004 -0.046 0.016
(0.02) (0.16) (0.06)
OP-Joined 0.036 3.089** -2.509**
(0.04) (2.11) (2.09)
OP-No Joined-PP -0.020 -2.833 1.719
(0.01) (0.87) (0.67)
OP-No Joined-SERPS -0.892 0.564 -1.913
(0.50) (0.20) (0.80)
NOP-PP 2.207* 1.261 2.418
(1.94) (0.65) (1.58)
Log Likelihood 625 328.5 364.6
Spells Ended from Risk 170 72 98
Sample Size 4.104
44Table 14: Semiparametric Baseline Hazard: Voluntary Job to Job Transitions. IV Model, Spec. 1
Quit Quit OP Quit NOP
dur1 1.663 -7.770 7.167
(0.26) (0.85) (0.78)
dur2 0.736 -7.702 5.587
(0.12) (0.85) (0.61)
dur3 0.588 -8.172 5.760
(0.09) (0.90) (0.63)
dur4 1.055 -7.831 6.325
(0.17) (0.86) (0.69)
dur5 0.387 -8.776 5.927
(0.06) (0.96) (0.64)
dur6 0.748 -8.592 6.403
(0.12) (0.94) (0.70)
dur7 0.429 -9.257 6.292
(0.07) (1.01) (0.68)
dur8 0.244 -8.800 5.553
(0.04) (0.96) (0.60)
dur9 0.232 -9.619 6.131
(0.04) (1.05) (0.66)
dur10 0.052 -8.832 5.110
(0.01) (0.97) (0.55)
dur10+ -0.340 -9.859 5.439
(0.05) (1.08) (0.59)
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